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INVESTMENT SPENDING IN THE NETHERLANDS:
THE IMPACT OF LIQUIDITY AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Abstract
This paper examines the relation between cash flow, corporate governance and fixed-
investment spending. In perfect capital markets we expect no systematic relationship.
However, Myers and Majluf’s (1984) asymmetric information hypothesis and Jensen’s (1986)
managerial discretion hypothesis present imperfections and predict a positive impact of cash
flow on investment in fixed assets. Aspects of corporate governance play an important role in
both theories. We measure the impact of cash flow on investment for a set of Dutch firms and
aim to distinguish between the asymmetric information hypothesis and the managerial
discretion hypothesis. Our findings show that cash flow is an important determinant of
investment expenditures. The impact of cash flow is largest for firms with low growth
opportunities suggesting that the managerial discretion hypothesis is most at work in the Dutch
setting. We also discern that the impact of governance characteristics on both investment and
the cash flow-sensitivity of investment differ between firms having low and high growth




In perfect markets, we expect no systematic relationship between cash flow and investments in
fixed assets or R&D expenditures. Investments should take place whenever they are expected
to realize a positive net present value. The empirical literature starting with the seminal article
of Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988), however, has well-documented substantial positive
influence of cash flow on firms’ investment spending.  Later studies have confirmed this for
R&D expenditures (see e.g. Himmelberg and Petersen (1994)). Initially, Myers and Majluf’s
(1984) asymmetric information hypothesis was accepted as the theoretical underpinning of
these empirical regularities. According to this hypothesis, financing constraints due to
asymmetric information causes the cash flow-investment relation. More recently, Jensen’s
(1986) managerial discretion hypothesis is found to provide an alternative underpinning, i.e.
overinvestment due to free cash flow (see Vogt (1994)). Thus both theories provide an
explanation for the positive influence of liquidity on firm’s investment spending.
Both theories also predict that the mechanisms of corporate governance influence the cash
flow-investment relation. The role of corporate governance in the conduct and performance of
companies is an active area of debate. Corporate governance measures how stakeholders
influence the decisions of firms. In perfect markets, corporate governance is not an issue. That
is, owners or hired managers maximize shareholders’ wealth and internal versus external funds
have the same price. However, as a result of the asymmetric information problem and the
managerial discretion problem, underinvestment and/or overinvestment problems may hinge on
the firms’ governance. As factors that describe a firm’s governance structure, we consider
shareholder concentration, board structure, insider shareholdings, dividends, leverage, bank
relations and the market for corporate control.
The basis of our empirical investigation is a panel data set of Dutch non-financial firms.  We
focus on Dutch firms, as they operate in a setting where different corporate governance
mechanisms are at work. In the Dutch institutional environment, firms are characterized by a
two-tier board system, multiple bank relations, presence of large blockholders, and a multitude
of takeover defenses. These characteristics provide a unique setting to test the influence of
several governance mechanisms on investment. Due to the presence of multiple technical
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takeover defenses in most of the Dutch firms, the market for corporate control is virtually
absent. In addition, share ownership by insiders is relatively small in the exchange-listed firms.
These characteristics induce the expectation that the managerial discretion hypothesis may be
highly relevant in the Netherlands. However, it remains an empirical question to which extent
alternative governance devices mitigate overinvestment and what the role of the asymmetric
information hypothesis is.
In this paper we empirically discriminate between the asymmetric information hypothesis and
the managerial discretion hypothesis for Dutch firms. Moreover, we analyze how corporate
governance alleviates or sharpens both hypotheses. More specific, we investigate how
corporate governance influences the impact of firms without good prospects and firms with
good prospects (respectively, the managerial discretion hypothesis and the asymmetric
information hypothesis). We expect that effective corporate governance reduces both
underinvestment and overinvestment problems, i.e. reduces the magnitude of the cash flow-
investment relation for both types of firms. Moreover, corporate governance may differentially
impact underinvestment and overinvestment problems.
A limited set of studies has investigated the relation between investment and governance
characteristics (Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991), Vogt (1994), Hadlock (1998), Cho
(1998), Gugler (1998) and Haid and Weigand (1998)). This paper advances the literature in at
least three respects. First, we extend the empirical framework initiated by Vogt (1994). That is,
we allow for varying degrees of asymmetric information problems and managerial discretion
problems within groups of firms, having good and bad prospects respectively. Second, we
elaborate on the impact of corporate governance separately on a group where we expect that
managerial discretion to dominate and one where asymmetric information applies. We analyze
how corporate governance alleviates or sharpens both hypotheses. Third, we provide evidence
on the impact of governance on investment decisions for an economy in which a large capital
market and international competition go together with managerial entrenchment and strong
banks.
Our findings show that cash flow is an important determinant of investment expenditures. The
impact of cash flow is significant for firms with bad prospects as well as firms with good
5
prospects. However, the impact of cash flow is largest for firms with a bad prospects, i.e. low
Tobin’s Q, suggesting that the managerial discretion hypothesis is most at work in the Dutch
setting. In the sample of firms with low Tobin’s Q, we find that larger insider shareholdings, a
larger dividend payout ratio, priority shares and preferred shares augment investment-cash flow
sensitivity, and worsen the managerial discretion problem. Managerial discretion problems are
not affected by bank-equity holdings or bank interlocks. In the high Tobin’s Q sample, effective
governance mechanisms for asymmetric information problems are a higher dividend payout
ratio and the legal board structure. We find that the mechanisms of governance vary between
the asymmetric information and managerial discretion hypotheses, as governance differently
affects investment in firms with good and bad prospects.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the relation
between investment and cash flow.  Section 3 describes our data set, while section 4 presents
the empirical analysis. Section 5 offers a discussion and section 6 concludes.
2. Investment and cash flow
In a perfect world firms’ investment opportunities fully determine their investment. The
empirical literature starting with the seminal article of Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988),
however, has well-documented substantial positive influence of cash flow on firms’ investment
spending. Two explanations prevail for this evidence. First, Myers and Majluf (1984) argue
that financing constraints due to asymmetric information causes the cash flow-investment
relation. A second explanation is the managerial discretion hypothesis, i.e. the relation is
caused by overinvestment due to free cash flow (see Jensen, 1986). In this section we will
discuss these theories in detail, define testable hypotheses and review the empirical literature.
2.1. Underinvestment: the asymmetric information hypothesis
In the theory of Myers and Majluf (1984), insiders of the firm are better informed about firm
value than capital markets are. The insiders aim to transfer wealth from new providers of
capital to the existing shareholders. Due to the information asymmetry in comparison with
insiders, providers of capital expect insiders to raise capital when this new capital is
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overvalued. The implication of this adverse selection is that managers and firms face a premium
on external financing. As external financing is expensive, firms will initially fund investments
from internal sources. If the investment spending exceeds the internal funds, the premium on
external financing may cause firms to reject positive net present value projects. This excessive
cost of external financing causes a liquidity constraint for firms, such that cash flow becomes
an important determinant of investment expenditures. In addition, firms may underinvestment if
the cash flows are insufficient. Myers and Majluf (1984) show that firms’ investment spending
is not only affected by investment opportunities. The availability of internal funds also plays a
role, as external funds are excessively costly.
The underinvestment theory of Myers and Majluf (1984) is based on two crucial assumptions.
First, firms are assumed to have good prospects, i.e. valuable investment opportunities. For
firms without investment opportunities the absence of liquidity cannot constrain investment.
Thus, the underinvestment explanation for the relation between cash flow and investment is
relevant for firms with investment opportunities. Moreover, the liquidity constraints are
expected to increase with investment opportunities because investment opportunities induce
information asymmetries.
The second crucial assumption concerns asymmetric information and disaligned interests. The
liquidity constraints are due to the premium for external financing, and this premium increases
with information asymmetry and disalignment of interests. A key source for the premium in
Myers and Majluf (1984) is share ownership by managers. Internal shareholdings induce
incentives to issue overvalued securities at the expense of new financiers by well-informed
managers. For this reason the cash flow-dependence of investment is expected to be higher for
firms with higher insider ownership. However, alternative governance mechanisms may induce
asymmetric information and disalign interests, or mechanisms may have the reverse impact. For
example, dividends are considered to transmit information, through the signaling role of
dividends. Thus, dividends may reduce asymmetric information. Similarly, bank relations
reduce information asymmetry between banks and firms. Large blockholders are expected to
have the opposite effect, whereas these shareholders have the incentive to transfer wealth from
new investors, in an interaction similar to insiders. In a firm’s board structure, effective boards
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may help to align interests and reduce informational problems. In similar vein, leverage1 and the
market for corporate control may serve as a disciplinary force. We hypothesize that insiders
and blockholders increase the cash flow-dependence of investments, while effective
mechanisms as dividends, bank relations, boards, leverage and the market for corporate control
reduce the cash flow-constraints.
For firms with profitable investment opportunities, investments enhance firm value (see Cho,
1998). For this reason, firms under the regime of Myers and Majluf (1984) may be able to
increase value by investing. This implies that effective governance devices, i.e. mechanisms
aligning interests and reducing information problems, will increase investment. We hypothesize
that investment increases with insider and block ownership, dividends, bank relations, boards,
leverage and the market for corporate control.
2.2. Overinvestment: the managerial discretion hypothesis
A second and competing explanation for a positive correspondence between cash flow and
investment expenditures relates to the free cash flow hypothesis of Jensen (1986). According
to Jensen, managers maximize other objectives than shareholders do. Managers aim to increase
firm size, because this increases their pay, status and power. The objective to maximize firm
size conflicts with shareholders’ interests in case firms have no valuable investment
opportunities. The cash flows that are at the discretion of managers, after valuable investments
are carried out, is free cash flow. Managers are likely to waste this free cash flow. Managers
impute projects at the expense of the welfare of shareholders, resulting in overinvestment. That
is, the available free cash flow is invested in projects increasing firm size but with negative net
present value. Cash flow and investment may therefore be positively correlated.
Similar to the asymmetric information hypothesis, two assumptions underlie the managerial
discretion hypothesis. First, for firms to overinvest, valuable investment opportunities are
assumed to be absent. The overinvestment explanation for the cash flow-dependence of
investments is relevant for firms without investment opportunities.2
                                                       
1 See Grossman and Hart (1982). Besides, Ross (1977) argues that leverage signals firm value. For this reason,
leverage may have an effect similar to the signaling role of dividends.
2 Note that in the asymmetric information regime, we expected the constraint to increase with investment
opportunities. A similar interaction is not expected in the managerial discretion regime.
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The second assumption in the managerial discretion hypothesis is that monitoring and incentive
structures are imperfect. If the managers were monitored perfectly, or if their interests were
perfectly aligned with shareholders’ interests, managers would not be able to overinvest. We
hypothesize that insiders, blockholders, dividends3, debt, bank relations, boards and the market
for corporate control reduce overinvestment, i.e. the impact of cash flow on investment
spendings.
It is obvious that in firms without profitable investment opportunities, investments will reduce
firm value. This implies that effective governance devices will reduce investment. We
hypothesize that investment decreases with insider and block ownership, dividends, debt, bank
relations, boards and the market for corporate control.
2.3. Underinvestment or overinvestment?
The discussions of the underinvestment and overinvestment problems show that in both
theories investment opportunities, cash flows, and governance characteristics interact and
determine investment spending. The investment opportunities are important because they
determine which of the two hypotheses may explain the cash flow-dependence. It should be
noted the theory concerns the marginal growth opportunities. Using Tobin’s Q as an
approximation we observe average investment opportunities. However, a firm with Q above
one may have no valuable investment options, while a firm with Q below one may come across
a valuable investment option. Apart from this caveat, Q allows us to separate firms with a
potential underinvestment problem from firms that are likely to overinvest. In this paper we
will test whether the cash flow-dependence and the impact of governance mechanisms differ
between the two groups of firms.
2.4. Empirical literature
The best known empirical study analyzing the importance of financing constraints is that by
Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988). They linked firm-specific characteristics as dividend
                                                       
3 In the asymmetric information hypothesis dividends serve as a mechanism to signal information. In the
managerial discretion hypothesis, dividends serve as a disciplinary mechanism because it subjects firms to the
disciplining by the market for external funds (see Easterbrook (1984)).
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payout and firm size, with the impact of cash flow on fixed investment in the US. Other studies
have replicated and extended this approach.4
The contributions most relevant for our paper are Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991),
Vogt (1994), Hadlock (1998), Cho (1998), Gugler (1998), and Haid and Weigand (1998).
Most of these papers investigate cash flow sensitivities of US firms. Vogt (1994) empirically
discriminates between the managerial discretion theory and the asymmetric information
hypothesis by including an interaction term between Tobin’s Q and cash flow in the regression
equation. For his sample of US-firms, he finds strong evidence for the presence of managerial
discretion while the influences of asymmetric information cannot be dismissed. Dividend is
found to reduce both problems. Hadlock (1998) studies the impact of insider ownership on the
cash flow-sensitivity of investment. The interaction term of cash flow and insider ownership is
found to be positive for insider ownership below 5% and negative above this threshold. Cho
(1998) investigates whether ownership structure influences investments directly, i.e. without
considering the interaction between cash flow and ownership. The author finds a non-
monotonic relation between insider ownership and investment for US Fortune 500 firms.5
Because the US governance structures differ substantially from the structures of firms in Japan
or the European continent, it is interesting to consider determinants of investment under
alternative structures. Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) investigate the cash flow-
sensitivities for a sample of Japanese firms, which is divided into group and non-group firms.
The non-group firms, characterized by relatively weak ties with banks, have a higher cash flow-
coefficient. Hoshi et al. (1991) spot the importance of overinvestment by allowing a differential
impact of cash flow for firms with good and bad prospects. They find no evidence for
overinvestment. Gugler (1998) analyzes Austrian investment spending and corporate
                                                       
4 Examples for the dividend approach are Fazzari and Petersen (1993), Bond and Meghir (1994), Gilchrist and
Himmelberg (1995), Hubbard, Kashyap and Whited (1995) and Gugler (1998). Examples of firm size are
Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) and Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995). Other
proposed sample splits are young versus old firms (Hubbard, Kashyap and Whited (1995) and Schaller (1993)),
leverage (Whited (1992)), bank-affiliated versus other firms (Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) and Van
Ees and Garretsen (1994)), science-based versus other firms (Weigand and Audretsch (1999)) and R&D-
intensive versus other firms (Brown (1997)). The general findings are that the increases in size and dividend
reduce cash flow-sensitivity of investment.
5 A positive relation between insider ownership and investment is found for ownership below 7% and above
38%, while the relation is negative for the remaining firms. In an additional analysis, the author applies
simultaneous equation regression in order to controls for endogeneity of ownership and Tobin’s Q
(approximation for firm value). These regressions reveal that investment influences Tobin’s Q and Tobin’s Q
influences insider ownership, but not vice versa.
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governance, and empirically investigates whether the validity of the asymmetric information
hypothesis and managerial discretion hypothesis depends on the ownership structure of the
firms. He applies sample splits and interacts the liquidity variables with the governance
variables. His findings suggest that investment of bank-controlled firms is not positively related
to cash flow. Asymmetric information problems prevail in family-owned firms, while
overinvestment is more prominent in state-controlled firms and pyramidal groups. Haid and
Weigand (1998) focus on investment spending and corporate governance in Germany. Using
sample splits, they report that liquidity positively affects investments in owner-controlled firms,
while management-controlled firms show no cash flow-constraints.
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) have criticized the approach suggested by Fazzari, Hubbard and
Petersen (1988) by making the point that, when examining in greater detail their data used, the
results do not support the presence of financing constraints. Firstly, they argue that for these
apparently financially constrained firms, firms could have augmented their use of cash and lines
of credit at a particular moment in time. Secondly, the firms that according to their
classification are most financially constrained show the lowest sensitivity of investment to
liquidity. In addition to Kaplan and Zingales’ (1997) criticism, there are other problems with
the empirical implementation of the Q-theory of investment. Only under specific assumptions,
average Tobin’s Q equals marginal Tobin’s Q.  Moreover, market expectations may differ from
the insiders’ valuations of opportunities (Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1996)). The resulting
implication could be that cash flow captures investment opportunities. In the empirical
implementation, we apply the solution offered by Fazzari and Petersen (1993) by introducing
changes in net working capital to the regression equation, to verify whether cash flow captures
liquidity or investment opportunities.
3. Data
Our data set contains information on the investments in fixed assets, the financial, asset, and
the governance structure of the Dutch non-financial firms listed at the Amsterdam Stock
Exchange from 1993 until 1998. The data for the investments and the financial and asset
structure are obtained from a data set of Statistics Netherlands (Centraal Bureau voor de
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Statistiek), which contains data on listed firms, including the financial annual report data. The
ownership structure data is obtained from the leading Dutch financial daily newspaper, Het
Financieele Dagblad, which publishes each year a list of exchange-listed firms and the
stakeholders6. Because the Dutch Law on Disclosure of Shareholdings requires the notification
of shareholdings when thresholds of 5%, 10%, 25%, 50%, or 66,7% are passed, we do not
have information of shareholdings below 5%. For this reason, a blockholder is defined as a
shareholder that owns at least 5% of the shares. Technical takeover defenses are from the
yearly overviews of all securities listed at the Amsterdam Stock Exchange (Gids bij de
Officiële Prijscourant van de Amsterdamse Effectenbeurs). The data for board members of the
non-financial and financial firms are from the Yearbook of Dutch Firms (Jaarboek Nederlandse
Ondernemingen). The data on the structured regimes for 1997 is obtained from the Monitoring
Report 1998 (which contains data over 1997) and the firm’s annual reports for 1992.7 In order
for a firm-year to be included in our set, we require that data is available for all items we
discussed.8 Our final data set contains an unbalanced panel of 132 firms, and 697 firm-years of
data.
For the replacement value of fixed assets and total assets we use the approximation described
by Perfect and Wiles (1994). In the Netherlands, firms either present replacement values
directly in their annual reports, or they present historical costs. If replacement values are
presented, the replacement values equal the book values. In case of historical costs we have to
adjust the value to approximate the replacement value. This is relevant for plant and
equipment. We assume that in a base year the replacement value equals the historical costs. For
each subsequent year we adjust this replacement value by adding new investments and
corrections for the growth in capital good prices and subtracting depreciation. Growth in
capital good prices is based upon the price index of investment goods, as provided by Statistics
                                                       
6 The notifications mandatory according to the Wet Melding Zeggenschap (WMZ). This Law on Disclosure of
Shareholdings (Wet Melding Zeggenschap) went into effect in 1992 and is the Dutch implementation of the EU
Transparency Directive 88/627.
7 In case we found a difference between 1992 and 1997, we investigated all annual reports over 1992-1997. The
annual reports allowed us to investigate (1) whether the supervisory board established (vaststellen) or approved
(goedkeuren) the annual accounts, and (2) whether the firms met the criteria for the structured regime. Under
the structured regime, the supervisory board establishes the annual accounts. In cases of inconsistency, we
contacted the firm.
8 Because we include lagged variables, the data for each year consists of data that year and the previous year.
Firm-years are excluded when the firm is not included in one of our sources. This may be due to a merger,
delisting or absence of data.
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Netherlands. The replacement value of the (fixed) assets is the book value of (fixed) assets plus
the difference between the replacement value and historical value of plant and equipment.9
The definitions of our variables and summary statistics for the full sample are presented in
Table 1.
[Please insert Table 1 here]
The summary statistics in Table 1 emphasize several characteristics that are relevant in the
Dutch institutional setting.10 On average firms have a dividend ratio of 33% and the long term
debt ratio is 13%. In continental European countries a major role in corporate governance is
attributed to banks. In the Netherlands, we find that the relative number of interlocking
directorates is 11.4%. Interlocking directorates are boardmembers of the firms who are also a
board members with one of the four leading Dutch banks (Abn-Amro, ING, Rabo and Fortis).
The number of interlocking directorates is measured relative to the total number of board
members. Banks own on average 7.7% of the firm’s equity.
The ownership structure of Dutch firms reveals the presence of substantial blockholdings. The
average largest blockholder owns 25.9% of the firm’s equity. The median largest blockholding
is 18.9%.
The boards of Dutch firms are two-tier boards, i.e. a managerial (Raad van Bestuur) and a
supervisory board (Raad van Commissarissen) is present. According to Dutch company law,
supervisory board members have to be independent from the management and serve the firm’s
interest, which includes all stakeholders. This implies that the monitoring role of the
supervisory board does not necessarily benefit the shareholders’ interests. Besides, several
firms have adopted the structured regime, which provides the supervisory board with
additional powers and limits shareholders’ influence. Examples are establishing the annual
accounts, election of management, election of supervisoary board and authority over major
                                                       
9 The impact of the adjustment of replacement values is modest. For example, the correlation between the
replacement value of fixed assets and the book value of fixed assets is 0.99.
10 See Kabir, Cantrijn and Jeunink (1997) and De Jong, DeJong, Mertens and Wasley (2000) for detailed
descriptions of the Dutch corporate governance setting.
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decisions by the management. Table 1 shows that the average board size is eight persons and
that relative number of supervisory board members is 66%, which implies that on average the
supervisory board outnumbers the management. Besides, 70% of the Dutch firms are under the
structured regime. Ownership by members of both boards is on average low, on average 6%.
Many Dutch firms have legal arrangements that serve as a protection against hostile takeovers.
These takeover defenses may disturb the market for corporate control. Even in case of the
absence of a takeover threat, the arrangements disable the influence of shareholders on the
management. Before, we discussed the structured regime. Priority shares are issued by 39% of
the firms and consist of a small number of shares that carry superior voting rights. Besides,
63% of the firms have preferred shares, i.e. the management is allowed to issue preferred
shares without further approval of shareholders and for which only 25% of the nominal value
has to be paid up. In case of a takeover attempt, the firm can place these shares with a
befriended party and pay for the shares with new debt. The dilution creates an effective
takeover defense. For the 37% of the firms with certificates, the shareholders own certificates
that only carry the cash flow-rights. The voting rights remain with a trust office that owns the
shares and issued the certificates. Normally, the management controls the trust office.
We define subsamples based on the firm’s Tobin’s Q. We use the average value of Tobin’s Q
over the years for which we have observations in order to avoid a bias towards observations in
years with higher market values. First, we divide the full sample into firms with an average
Tobin’s Q below the median of all average Q’s and firms with average Q equal to or above the
median. We also make 33% subsamples based on average Q. The characteristics of the
subsamples are in the Appendix. If we consider the summary statistics for the 50% subsamples
in Panel A of the Appendix, we find that the high Q sample has higher investment, cash flow
and size. These firms have less debt, relatively smaller supervisory boards, are less likely to be
structured regime firms and have less bank shareholdings (only 1-% significance level). In
Panel B, we find that Q is positively related to cash flow and negatively related to the
structured regime (significance levels 1% to 10%).
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4. Regression results
Our regressions analyze several aspects of potential cash constraints.  In a first subsection, we
check whether liquidity is important in explaining investments in fixed assets or not. The
second subsection tries to separate between two alternative theories explaining the potential
influence of cash flow on investment, i.e. the asymmetric information hypothesis and the
managerial discretion hypothesis. The third section discusses how governance affects the
importance of liquidity in explaining fixed investment, and investigates how governance shapes
the importance of the asymmetric information hypothesis and the managerial discretion
hypothesis.
4.1. Is liquidity important in explaining investment?
We begin this section by reporting conventional regressions of fixed-investment expenditures
on cash flow and control variables for growth opportunities. Many recent papers have
examined finance constraints on fixed investment with an equation similar to the following:
ititititit vCFQI +++++= λµγβα (1)
The variable Iit represents investment in plant and equipment investment for firm i during year
t, scaled by the firm’s beginning of period replacement value of fixed assets.  Tobin’s Q at the
beginning of year t (Qit) controls for changes in investment demand due to investment
opportunities. The impact of cash flow (CF) on investment is reflected by the coefficient γ.
Both investment (I) and cash flow (CF) are scaled by the firm’s beginning of period
replacement value of fixed assets, to neutralize potential heteroskedasticity. In all
specifications, we allow for time-fixed effects (µt) and firm-fixed effects (λi). The coefficient
estimates for various specifications of equation (1) are reported in Table 2.
[Please insert Table 2 here]
In column (1) we report the results of an OLS regression of equation (1). The results show that
the cash flow-coefficient is positive and significantly different from zero at the 1-% level,
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conform results reported in other studies.  The coefficient of Tobin’s Q also is significantly
positive, at the 1% level.
In spite of the well-developed microfoundations of the Q-theory of investment, other variables
typically have explanatory power for investment in Q-equations. Table 2 reports the results for
additional regressions including other variables. A first variable is the change in working capital
(working capital investment) scaled by the replacement value of fixed assets. Fazzari and
Petersen (1993) argue that firms may draw down their working capital (current assets minus
current liabilities) to smooth fixed investments. Including the change in the net-working-capital
ratio scaled by fixed assets allows to isolate the liquidity effect from the informational part of
cash flow (see also Haid and Weigand (1999)).  In other words, a negative coefficient
accompanied with an increase in the cash flow-coefficient suggests that cash flow does not
capture investment opportunities. The results reported in column (2) of Table 2 are not
contradicting this: the change in net working capital (∆NWC) has the predicted negative
coefficient (though not significantly different from zero) and the cash flow-coefficient increases
slightly. 11 A second variable often significant in investment equations is current sales scaled by
beginning-of-year replacement value of fixed assets. As in Fazzari and Petersen (1993), we
apply two-stage least squares regresssion (2SLS) in order to instrument the change in the net
working capital ratio with the working capital stock at the beginning of the period scaled by
beginning-of-year fixed assets. The firm’s choice of working-capital investment should depend
negatively on the size of the initial stock because the marginal valuation of working capital falls
as its stock rises. Also sales has been instrumented by its lagged value to take care of potential
endogeneity problems. As reported in column (3) of Table 2, the coefficient of working-capital
investment is in all regressions negative and highly significant.12 In the remainder of this paper
we choose to report the results of the 2SLS regressions, containing fixed time-effects and firm-
effects, in which we instrument the change in the net-working-capital ratio with the level of the
working capital at the beginning of the period, and sales with its lagged value.
                                                       
11 Note that working capital investment may be endogenous, as it is a decision variable of the firm. Later on, we
instrument the change in net-working-capital ratio.
12 Even after controlling for other factors often being important in explaining investment, we run the risk that
these proxies are less than perfect for investment opportunities. These proxy measures may introduce
measurement bias; that is a positive estimated coefficient of cash flow may indicate shifts in investment demand
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4.2. Asymmetric information and/or managerial discretion?
In order to discriminate between the Asymmetric Information Hypothesis (AIH) and the
Managerial Discretion Hypothesis (MDH), we apply the strategy initiated by Vogt (1994). The
author develops a theoretical model and shows that discriminating between these two
hypotheses is possible by investigating the interaction between Tobin’s Q and cash flow. We
include the term beginning-of-year Q times cash flow (Q*CF). A positive sign of the coefficient
implies that firms with a higher Tobin’s Q have a higher cash flow-coefficient. This compares
with higher liquidity constraints which is in line with the AIH. A negative coefficient is in line
with MDH, as the cash flow-coefficient for lower Q-firms becomes higher. Column (4) of
Table 2 summarizes the results of this first exercise.  The coefficient for Q*CF is slightly
negative, though not statistically different from zero. This implies that for our sample of firms
this technique does not help in discriminating between AIH or MDH.
Table 3 further explores the issue of MDH versus AIH, by applying an exercise inspired by
Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991). The overinvestment theory predicts that firms with
poor prospects should be more sensitive to liquidity than the investment of firms with good
prospects. In addition to the variables used in the previous regressions, we introduce in column
(1) of Table 3 two interaction terms (1) cash flow times a dummy variable which equals one if
Q is above median and (2) cash flow times a dummy variable if Q is below median.  The cash
flow-coefficient for low Q is higher (though not statistically significant) than the one for high
Q. Column (2) combines the modelisations of Vogt (1994) and Hoshi et al. (1991). That is, we
allow for 2 separate intercepts for the cash flow-coefficient as in Hoshi et al. (1991) and
interact Q*CF for both groups (LQ50*CF*Q and HQ50*CF*Q).
[Please insert Table 3 here]
In Table 3, both coefficients of the interaction terms LQ50*CF*Q and HQ50*CF*Q are
negative but not statistically significant. They nevertheless suggest the importance of
overinvestment, as the LQ50*CF is significantly higher than the HQ50*CF. Columns (3) and
(4) of Table 3 further eluminate the distinction between managerial discretion and asymmetric
                                                                                                                                                                            
and future profitability, and not pointing at financing constraints. However, this concern should not be
exaggerated, as shown by the results of introducing net-working capital in our regressions.
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information, but include the lowest 33 percentile Q-firms, the median Q-firms and the highest
33 percentile Q-firms. The cash flow-coefficient of the lowest Q-firms (LQ33*CF) in column
(3) is 0.584, which is significantly higher than the one of the other firms (0.127 and 0.195). No
significant difference results between the median and high Q-group. This result implies that in
the Netherlands the managerial discretion hypothesis is highly relevant, in comparison with the
asymmetric information hypothesis. The interaction terms with Q in column (4) are not
significant and an F-test rejects their joint significance.13 As the cut-off value of Tobin’s Q
between the low 33 percentile firms and the other firms (median and high group) is
approximately one, we decide to focus on two groups, i.e, the group of LQ33 firms and the
other (medium and high group). Moreover, Vogt (1994)’s theoretical model suggests these
cut-off values for discrimination between MDH and AIH.
4.3. Does governance influence investment and the cash flow-sensitivity of investment?
In the previous analysis we concluded that two different agency problems are at work in the
two subsamples. Consequently, we expect that governance influences both investment and the
impact of liquidity on investment also differently in the two subsamples. We empirically tackle
this conjecture using three types of equations. Hadlock (1998) and Gugler (1998) inspire the
first. Governance affects investment via its impact on the cash flow-coefficient.  In other
words, is the magnitude of the LQ33*CF and the MHQ33*CF affected by governance
mechanisms? In case governance reduces AIH and reduces MDH, the magnitude of the cash
flow-coefficient reported in the previous regressions should be closer to zero.  We approach
this by interacting the cash flow variable with the respective governance data we have. As
previously discussed, our governance data include dividends14, debt, ownership, firm-bank
relations, board structure, and takeover defenses. We interact cash flow with the governance
variables. This implies that the coefficient of the interaction term represents whether
governance mitigates (negative sign) or aggravates (positive sign) the cash flow-impact. A
                                                       
13 The F-test gives a value of 1.24<F3,550=8.53.
14 Past studies have further elaborated on the impact of cash flow on investment in fixed assets by selecting
firms that are expected to face financing constraints using dividends. The applied technique is the one of
sample splits. We compared firms with a low-dividend payout ratio with those having a high-dividend payout
ratio. We expect that low-dividend face relatively high asymmetric information and, therefore, are more likely
to be confronted with financing constraints. Our results (not reported) reveal no statistically and economic
significant differences. Similarly we applied firm size as sample split criterion, expecting small firms to face
financing constraints. Again, our results (not reported) reveal no statistically and economic significant
differences. These findings are in line with those reported in Van Ees and Gerretsen (1994).
18
second specification is used by Cho (1998), who tests the direct influence of governance
(insider holdings) on investment. We control for these direct relations, by including the
governance variable directly into the investment equation. A third way and the approach we
adopt, is to include both the direct effect of governance on investment and the interaction
effect via cash flow, i.e. combine the approach of Hadlock (1998) and Cho (1998). The results
of the latter exercise are displayed in Table 4.
[Please insert Table 4 here]
In column (1) of Table 4, for convenience, we repeat our results without explicitly including
governance variables. Columns (2) to (12) represent the impact of one governance variable in
each column.15 We start the discussion by focussing on the managerial discretion hypothesis,
i.e. the low Q-firms.  Therefore, in the different columns, we discuss the coefficients of
LQ33*CF, LQ33*GOV (the direct effect of the respective governance variable), and
LQ33*GOV*CF (the effect of governance via its impact on cash flow). Column (2) focusses
on the effect of lagged dividend. A higher dividend payout ratio significantly decreases
investment for the low Q-firms, whereas it increases the level of the cash flow-coefficient. Thus
dividend has contradicting implications. The following governance variables are the debt-
related variables, i.e. leverage, relative bank interlocks (BNK_IR) and bank equity holdings.
None of these variables affects in a significant way investment. The next governance variable is
the impact of the size of the largest shareholder (C1). Again no significant effects are found.
The size of inside equity augments in a significant way the impact of cash flow, aggravating the
managerial discretion problem. This result is surprising, given the negative wealth effects of
overinvestment. This conclusion differs from Hadlock’s (1998) findings, as he reports a
positive coefficient for ownership levels below 5% and a negative coefficient for larger
ownership levels incorporating all -low and high- Q-firms. However, Cho (1998) documents a
direct negative influence on investment which differs from our findings, but again no separate
                                                       
15 Several Chow-tests for testing the significance of the fixed effects reveal that the fixed effects are jointly
significant and should enter the regression equation even after introducing the governance variables. The F-
values are computed as follows: F (n-1,nT-n-K) = [ (R2(unrestricted) - R2(restricted)) / (n-1) ] / [ (1 –
R2(unrestricted)) / (nT-n-K) ] with n the number of firms, K the number of other regressors and T the number of
observations per firm.
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effects between low and high Q-firms are allowed.16 The presence of the structured regime
(SR) as well as board size show that the board structure does not affect in a significant way
investment.17 Finally, we consider the impact of a number of takeover defenses, i.e. priority
shares (PRIO), preferred shares (PREF) and certificates (CERT). We expect those to
aggravate the managerial discretion problem. Our hypotheses are only partially confirmed: the
cash flow-coefficient increases for PRIO and PREF. However, investments decrease for firms
with PRIO.
Now we focus on the coefficients of MHQ33*CF, MHQ33*GOV and MHQ33*GOV*CF in
order to analyze how governance affects the asymmetric information problems. Those firms are
characterized by Q-values larger than one, and belong to firms where we expect asymmetric
information problems to be largest (Vogt (1994)).  Column (2) displays the results of the effect
of the dividend payout ratio. Larger payout ratio’s increase investment, and reduce the cash
flow-coefficient, which is in line with reducing the asymmetric information problem. The debt
ratio does not show up with significant coefficients. Relative bank interlocks (BNK_IR) and
bank equity holdings aggravate the information problem, as the direct influence on investment
is negative and the impact on the cash flow-coefficient increases.  The size of the largest
shareholder does not influence in a significant way the magnitude of the asymmetric
information problem. We also find no effect of inside equity. This implies that Myers and
Majluf (1984) is not confirmed for the Netherlands, as larger inside equity holdings show no
significant effects. The presence of the structured regime increases investment and reduces the
impact of cash flow. Also, the number of board members decreases the cash flow-constraint.18
Priority shares augment the cash flow-coefficient, strengthening the asymmetric information
problem. Preferred shares show countervailing effects. They increase investments but at the
same time blow up the cash flow-coefficient.
                                                       
16 Cho (1998) distinguishes insider ownership below 7%, between 7% and 38% and above 38%. The negative
coefficient (with a t-value of 3.43) is found in the 7% to 38% interval, while the results for the interval above
38% are insignificant. Cho (1998) reports a positive influence below 7%. However, as our data does not include
stakes below 5%, we cannot replicate this test.
17 The results for relative supervisory board size in the low Q-sample show no significant results (not reported).
18 In the high Q-sample, the results for relative supervisory board size show a significantly (at the 1% level)
negative indirect influence on investment, while the direct influence is insignificant (results not reported). We
expect that this finding is driven by board size, which shows precisely the opposite result and is the
denominator in relative supervisory board size.
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5. Discussion
The regression results in the previous section highlight two clear findings. First, two different
problems are at work in the two subsamples. The dissimilar cash flow-coefficients prove that
we were correct in defining subsamples of firms with low and high Tobin’s Q. Second, the
importance of the different subsamples is emphasized by the divergence in the impact
governance has on investment. This holds for both the indirect impact (through the influence of
governance on the cash flow-sensitivity) and the direct impact (the influence of governance on
investment). For each variable we find differences between the low and high Q samples for
both direct and indirect coefficients.19 In the remainder of this section we first interpret the
results for the two subsamples in light of the theory and the Dutch institutional setting that
underpin the results. Second, we discuss the role of groups of governance mechanisms and
compare their impact over both subsamples.
In the low Q-sample we expect that the managerial discretion hypothesis is driving the results.
In Table 3 we noticed that the cash flow-sensitivity is relatively high in this segment. Given the
importance of overinvestment, we conjecture that several governance mechanisms are not
related to investment or may even induce overinvestment. We find that debt, banks and the
board structure have no effect. The takeover defenses, in the form of priority shares and
preferred shares worsen the overinvestment problem through the cash flow-sensitivity.
Surprisingly, insiders worsen the overinvestment problem, through their entrenchment.
Apparently, they prefer size to the value of their shares. The results for these governance
mechanisms show that in the Netherlands weak governance, as a condition for overinvestment
is largely present. The only mechanism that provides effective governance is dividend through
its direct impact. However, in their indirect influence, dividends show contradictory results. In
general, there are not many forces effectively governing the overinvestors, which explains the
high cash flow-coefficient.20
                                                       
19 Two exceptions are in the indirect relations, i.e. priority and preferred shares.
20 The direct impact of priority shares has a contradictory influence, in comparison with the indirect impact.
This may be explained by the lower percentage of firms with priority shares in the low Q-sample (33% versus
41%).
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In the high Q-sample we predict that the asymmetric information hypothesis is at work. The
findings in Table 3 showed that this underinvestment problem is of minor importance, in
comparison with overinvestment. Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that the asymmetric
information problem is especially relevant in firms with high managerial shareholdings and/or
blockholdings. In our findings the ownership structure has no effect on investment spendings.
This implies that the key condition for Myers and Majluf’s (1984) theory does not seem to hold
in our sample. We find that debt has no effect. As expected we find that priority and preferred
shares worsen the cash flow-constraint of the firms. Note that the results for the direct
influence of preferred shares are contradictory. We have no explanation for these findings.
Contrary to expectations, we find that banks (direct and indirect) worsen the asymmetric
information problems. Several characteristics induce investment in the high Q-sample.
Dividends are effective, both directly and indirectly. The structured regime seems to be
effective, both directly and indirectly. Similarly, board size (indirect) shows to be an efficient
governance variable.  In the high Q-sample we find several effective governance mechanisms,
which may explain the lower cash flow-sensitivity in this sample.
So far, we discussed our findings for the governance mechanisms separately for the two
subsamples. We also noted that the effects of governance mechanisms differ between the
samples. It is interesting to compare each mechanism over both samples. Dividends are
effective in both samples. This mechanism is most likely to act relatively independent of the
institutional setting. However, the indirect effect in the low Q sample indicates ineffective
governance. Debt and banks are not effective in both samples. In the asymmetric information
sample banks even have an adverse effect, both direct and indirect. This implies that we find
that banks fail in the Netherlands in their role of governing firms and providing capital. A
potential explanation is a sample selection problem as banks may be on the board precisely in
firms with large asymmetric information problems. With respect to the ownership structure we
find that in the low Q-sample insiders seem to be entrenched overinvestors (indirect). In the
high Q-sample we find no effect, which contradicts Myers and Majluf (1984). The two-tier
board system in the Netherlands and several other European countries is heavily debated. Our
findings show that in the low Q-sample board has no effect. This implies that the monitoring
function of board on overinvestment is absent. On the other hand, in the high Q-sample the
structured regime and board size are effective. These findings suggest that the board is helpful
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in firms that already have good prospects, but fail to monitor firms with bad prospects. Our
findings for takeover defenses reveal that priority shares and preferred shares have the same
and expected indirect impact in both samples. Takeover defenses have a negative impact, as
they shield firms from shareholder activism and the market for corporate control.  However, it
is puzzling that priority shares in the low Q-sample and preferred shares in the high Q-sample
have contradictory direct effects.
6. Concluding remarks
A hotly debated issue in the investment spending literature is whether and why investment
depends on internally generated funds. Theory offers two competing explanations for why
investment may hinge on the availability of internal funds. Either managers are wasting free
cash flow (managerial discretion) and overinvestment results. Or asymmetric information
between and among owners and external fund providers induces an external finance premium
yielding underinvestment (asymmetric information hypothesis).
This paper finds that cash flow is a significant variable in explaining fixed investments in the
Netherlands. We empirically discriminate between the asymmetric information hypothesis and
managerial discretion hypothesis by interacting Tobin’s Q and cash flow, further refining Vogt
(1994). Our analysis shows that both high Q-firms and low Q-firms posit a positive cash flow-
dependence. However, low Q-firms have a significantly higher cash flow-coefficient than
medium and high Q-firms. The interaction term between Tobin’s Q and cash flow within these
subgroups is not significant suggesting that two groups −low and high Q-firms− should be
considered. The level of the cash flow-coefficient is larger in the low Q-group pointing out the
importance of managerial discretion.
The characteristics of the Dutch institutional setting allow for an interesting analysis of the
impact of corporate governance on investment, an analysis which is not possible for US-data.
For the managerial discretion hypothesis we find that in low Q-firms the cash flow-coefficient
increases with insider holdings, dividends and takeover defenses (priority shares and preferred
shares). Investment decreases with dividends and priority shares in this subsample. In the
23
asymmetric information subsample, i.e. for high Q-firms, we find that dividends, the structured
regime and board size reduce the cash flow-sensitivity, while bank-relations and takeover
defenses (priority shares and preferred shares) have the opposite effect. Investment increases
with dividends, the structured regime and preferred shares, whereas investment decreases with
bank-relations. These results confirm that the mechanisms of governance differ between the
asymmetric information and managerial discretion hypotheses, as governance differently affects
investment and the cash flow-sensitivity of investment in firms with good and bad prospects.
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Table 1: Definitions and descriptive statistics of variables for investments and financial and governance structures
Definitions and descriptive statistics for the full sample for the variables used.  The sample consists of 697 observations for 132 firms in the 1993 to 1998 period. The data
for the investments and the financial structure are obtained from Statistics Netherlands. The ownership structure data is from Het Financieele Dagblad. Technical takeover
defenses are from the Gids bij de Officiële Prijscourant van de Amsterdamse Effectenbeurs. The data for board members of the non-financial and financial firms are from
the Jaarboek Nederlandse Ondernemingen. The data on the structured regimes for 1997 is obtained from the Monitoring Report 1998 and the firm’s annual reports. In
order for a firm-year to be included in the data set, we require that data is available for all items. Blockholdings are defined as stakes of 5% and more and expressed as a
percentage of the firm’s equity. The items denoted t are measured over or in the current year or at the beginning of the current year, while the items denoted t-1 refer to the
previous year and items denoted t+1 refer to the next year.
Variable Description Code Mean Median Std.Dev.
Investment fixed assets Fixed-investment expenditures (t)/replacement value of fixed assets (t) I 0.220 0.161 0.324
Tobin’s Q Market value of total assets (t)/replacement value of total assets (t) Q 1.406 1.195 0.764
Cash flow Cash flow (t)/replacement value of fixed assets (t) CF 0.413 0.265 0.584
Change net working capital (Net working capital (t+1)-net working capital (t))/replacement value of
fixed assets (t)
∆NWC 0.092 0.035 0.639
Sales Sales (t)/replacement value of fixed assets (t) SLS 7.657 4.012 13.155
Fixed assets Replacement value of fixed assets (t) in million Dutch guilders RVFA 2149.77 190.85 9563.67
Dividend Dividend payout ratio (t-1) DIV 0.334 0.350 0.338
Debt Long-term debt (t)/replacement value of total assets (t) DEBT 0.128 0.111 0.108
Relative bank interlocks Number of bank interlocks (t-1)/ /number of board members (t-1) BNK_IR 0.114 0 0.164
Bank blockholdings Blockholdings by banks (t-1) BNK_EQ 7.711 5.140 10.394
Largest blockholding Stake of the largest blockholder (t-1) C1 25.886 18.890 21.215
Insider blockholdings Blockholdings by members of managerial and supervisory boards (t-1) INSIDE_EQ 6.014 0 18.278
Structured regime Dummy with value of 1 for presence of structural regime (t-1), 0 otherwise SR 0.702 1 0.458
Board size Number of board members (t-1) BOARD 8.09 7 3.71
Supervisory board Number of supervisory board members (t-1)/number of board members (t-1) S_BOARD 0.658 0.667 0.114
Priority shares Dummy with value of 1 for presence of priority shares (t-1), 0 otherwise PRIO 0.39 0 0.49
Preferred shares Dummy with value of 1 for presence of preferred shares (t-1), 0 otherwise PREF 0.63 1 0.48
Certificates Dummy with value of 1 for presence of certificates (t-1), 0 otherwise CERT 0.37 0 0.48
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Table 2: Regression analysis of determinants of investment for basic variables
Regression results for the basic variables. The sample consists of 697 observations for 132 firms in the 1993 to 1998 period. The definitions and data sources of the variables
are in Table 1. The explained variable is investment in fixed assets over replacement value of fixed assets (I). The regressions contain firm and year dummies (results not
reported). In columns (1) and (2) are OLS regressions. Columns (3) and (4) contain 2SLS regressions in which ∆NWC is instrumented by the beginning-of-the-period net
working capital and SLS is instrumented by one-period lagged SLS.  The t-values are in parentheses. Significant coefficients are indicated by * (10% level), ** (5% level),
and *** (1% level).
Variable (1) OLS (2) OLS (3) 2SLS (4) 2SLS
Constant -0.023 (-0.16) -0.032 (-0.20) 0.022 ( 0.47) 0.057 ( 0.53)
Q 0.099 ( 3.24)*** 0.099 ( 3.24)*** 0.098 ( 4.41)*** 0.132 ( 3.25)***
CF 0.221 ( 4.71)*** 0.236 ( 4.73)*** 0.190 ( 2.51)** 0.223 ( 2.63)***
∆NWC -0.018 (-0.90) -0.160 (-3.15)*** -0.152 (-2.98)***
SLS 0.021 ( 4.29)*** 0.020 ( 4.16)***
Q*CF -0.011 (-0.87)
Adj. R2 0.242 0.242 0.253 0.253
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Table 3: Regression analysis of determinants of investment with interaction between cash flow and Tobin’s Q
Regression results for the basic variables and interaction between cash flow and Tobin’s Q. The sample consists of 697 observations for 132 firms in the 1993 to 1998
period. The definitions and data sources of the variables are in Table 1. The explained variable is investment in fixed assets over replacement value of fixed assets (I). The
regressions contain firm and year dummies (results not reported). In columns (1) and (2) are OLS regressions. Columns (3) and (4) contain 2SLS regressions in which
∆NWC is instrumented by the beginning-of-the-period net working capital and SLS is instrumented by one-period lagged SLS. LQ50 is 1 for firms with an average Tobin’s
Q below the median, and 0 otherwise. HQ50 is 1 for firms with an average Tobin’s Q equal to or above the median, and 0 otherwise. LQ33 is 1 for firms in the lower 33%
average Tobin’s Q interval, and 0 otherwise;  HQ33 is 1 for firms in the upper 33% average Tobin’s Q interval, and 0 otherwise; for the remaining firms MQ33 is 1. The t-
values are in parentheses. Significant coefficients are indicated by * (10% level), ** (5% level), and *** (1% level).
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 0.086 ( 0.87) 0.044 ( 0.41) 0.070 ( 0.69) -0.033 (-0.22)
Q 0.115 ( 3.57)*** 0.142 ( 3.44)*** 0.117 ( 3.53)*** 0.144 ( 3.30)***
∆NWC -0.148 (-3.41)*** -0.160 (-3.43)*** -0.196 (-3.99)*** -0.200 (-3.90)***
SLS 0.020 ( 4.13)*** 0.020 ( 4.09)*** 0.022 ( 4.41)*** 0.022 ( 4.29)***
LQ50*CF 0.224 ( 2.15)** 0.491 ( 1.81)*
HQ50*CF 0.170 ( 2.31)** 0.234 ( 2.38)**
LQ50*CF*Q -0.226 (-1.07)
HQ50*CF*Q -0.014 (-0.88)
LQ33*CF 0.584 ( 3.22)*** 0.564 ( 0.88)
MQ33*CF 0.127 ( 1.18) 0.312 ( 1.11)
HQ33*CF 0.195 ( 2.52)** 0.260 ( 2.45)**
LQ33*CF*Q 0.031 ( 0.05)
MQ33*CF*Q -0.147 (-0.70)
HQ33*CF*Q -0.014 (-0.80)
Adj. R2 0.260 0.259 0.250 0.250
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Table 4: Regression analysis of determinants of investment including governance characteristics
Regression results for the basic variables and interaction between cash flow and Tobin’s Q. The sample consists of 697 observations for 132 firms in the 1993 to 1998
period. The definitions and data sources of the variables are in Table 1. The explained variable is investment in fixed assets over replacement value of fixed assets (I). The
regressions contain firm and year dummies (results not reported). In columns (1) and (2) are OLS regressions. Columns (3) and (4) contain 2SLS regressions in which
∆NWC is instrumented by the beginning-of-the-period net working capital and SLS is instrumented by one-period lagged SLS. LQ33 is 1 for firms in the lower 33%
average Tobin’s Q interval, and 0 otherwise; for the remaining firms MHQ33 is 1. The t-values are in parentheses. Significant coefficients are indicated by * (10% level),
** (5% level), and *** (1% level).
Variable (1) Basic regression (2) DIV (3) DEBT (4) BNK_IR (5) BNK_EQ (6) C1
Constant -0.009 (-0.08) -0.011 (-0.08) 0.026 ( 0.18) 0.049 ( 0.35) 0.038 ( 0.28) -0.022 (-0.15)
Q 0.123 ( 3.84)*** 0.124 ( 3.91)*** 0.144 ( 4.13)*** 0.122 ( 3.75)*** 0.128 ( 3.93)*** 0.120 ( 3.62)***
∆NWC -0.186 (-3.29)*** -0.186 (-3.39)*** -0.202 (-3.40)*** -0.185 (-3.26)*** -0.206 (-3.51)*** -0.206 ( 4.28)***
SLS 0.022 ( 4.40)*** 0.022 ( 4.22)*** 0.020 ( 3.95)*** 0.022 ( 4.40)*** 0.021 ( 4.14)*** 0.022 ( 4.35)***
LQ33*CF 0.558 ( 2.93)*** -0.134 (-0.48) 0.743 ( 3.02)*** 0.561 ( 2.82)*** 0.662 ( 3.06)*** 0.889 ( 3.01)***
LQ33*GOV -0.415 (-2.15)** -0.323 (-0.65) 0.017 ( 0.06) 0.002 ( 0.49) 0.004 ( 1.09)
LQ33*GOV*CF 2.105 ( 3.04)*** -2.201 (-1.35) -0.058 (-0.04) -0.016 (-0.97) -0.014 (-1.32)
MHQ33*CF 0.161 ( 2.14)** 0.231 ( 3.01)*** 0.186 ( 2.34)** 0.158 ( 2.11)** 0.132 ( 1.67)* 0.228 ( 2.53)**
MHQ33*GOV 0.156 ( 2.02)** 0.010 ( 0.31) -0.696 (-2.06)** -0.008 (-2.53)** 0.002 ( 0.91)
MHQ33*GOV *CF -0.276 (-2.06)** -0.455 (-1.60) 1.165 ( 1.70)* 0.005 ( 1.59) -0.001 (-0.99)
Adj. R2 0.247 0.241 0.241 0.247 0.241 0.243
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Variable (7) INSIDE_EQ (8) SR (9) BOARD (10) PRIO (11) PREF (12) CERT
Constant 0.006 ( 0.04) -0.224 (-1.29) 0.067 (-0.45) -0.098 (-0.62) -0.088 (-0.61) 0.031 ( 0.23)
Q 0.127 ( 3.81)*** 0.135 ( 4.16)*** 0.139 ( 4.36)*** 0.122 ( 3.73)*** 0.117 ( 3.62)*** 0.123 ( 3.77)***
∆NWC -0.207 (-4.76)*** -0.151 (-2.99)*** -0.157 (-3.04)*** -0.216 (-3.63)*** -0.206 (-3.61)*** -0.187 (-3.30)***
SLS 0.024 ( 4.74)*** 0.025 ( 4.96)*** 0.019 ( 3.75)*** 0.032 ( 5.99)*** 0.027 ( 5.36)*** 0.023 ( 4.55)***
LQ33*CF 0.182 ( 0.74) -0.078 (-0.21) 0.317 ( 0.57) 0.082 ( 0.35) -0.031 (-0.10) 0.605 ( 2.95)***
LQ33*GOV 0.001 ( 0.09) 0.137 ( 0.59) -0.020 (-0.80) -0.390 (-2.35)** -0.158 (-1.36) 0.010 ( 0.05)
LQ33*GOV*CF 0.026 ( 2.09)** 0.627 ( 1.46) 0.029 ( 0.35) 0.768 ( 2.23)** 0.774 ( 2.11)** -0.497 (-1.02)
MHQ33*CF 0.160 ( 2.05)** 0.195 ( 2.54)** 0.416 ( 3.15)*** -0.051 (-0.62) 0.016 ( 0.19) 0.154 ( 2.02)**
MHQ33*GOV 0.001 ( 0.25) 0.295 ( 2.42)** -0.012 (-0.94) 0.038 ( 0.39) 0.199 ( 2.35)** 0.188 ( 1.22)
MHQ33*GOV *CF -0.001 (-0.34) -0.250 (-3.03)*** -0.042 (-2.68)*** 0.365 ( 4.02)*** 0.194 ( 2.24)** -0.104 (-0.58)
Adj. R2 0.250 0.263 0.266 0.261 0.260 0.243
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Appendix: Descriptive statistics for Tobin’s Q subsamples of variables for investments and financial and governance structures
Descriptive statistics for the subsamples for the variables used. The full sample consists of 697 observations for 132 firms in the 1993 to 1998 period. The data sources are in
Table 1. Average Tobin’s Q of a firm is the average value of Tobin’s Q over all yearly observations for that firm. In Panel A we define subsamples based on 50% intervals
for average Tobin’s Q. The low 50% Tobin’s Q sample includes firms with an average Tobin’s Q below the median of average Tobin’s Q. The high 50% Tobin’s Q sample
includes firms with an average Tobin’s Q above or equal to the median of average Tobin’s Q. The sample size is 347 and 350, respectively. In Panel B we define subsamples
based on 33% intervals for average Tobin’s Q. The samples size is 231 for the low 33% sample, 235 for the middle 33% sample and 231 for the high 33% sample. The t-
values for the differences between subsamples are in parentheses and are based on an independent samples t-test. Significant differences are indicated by * (10% level), **
(5% level), and *** (1% level).







Variable Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Diff. t-value
I 0.164 0.306 0.275 0.333 0.111 ( 4.57)***
Q 0.995 0.181 1.812 0.893 0.817 (16.76)***
CF 0.291 0.388 0.533 0.708 0.241 ( 5.58)***
∆NWC 0.059 0.524 0.125 0.736 0.066 ( 1.36)
SLS 8.097 16.930 7.222 7.782 -0.875 (-0.88)
RVFA 1207.89 370.32 3083.49 12961.85 1875.50 ( 2.61)***
DIV 0.308 0.225 0.359 0.419 0.050 ( 1.97)**
DEBT 0.138 0.109 0.117 0.105 -0.021 (-2.67)***
BNK_IR 0.117 0.173 0.112 0.154 -0.005 (-0.41)
BNK_EQ 9.550 11.787 5.888 8.426 -3.662 (-4.71)***
C1 24.566 19.339 27.195 22.877 2.628 ( 1.64)
INSIDE_EQ 5.587 18.406 6.438 18.167 0.852 ( 0.62)
SR 0.787 0.410 0.617 0.487 -0.170 (-4.98)***
BOARD 7.73 3.38 8.44 3.99 0.71 ( 2.52)**
S_BOARD 0.690 0.091 0.626 0.124 -0.064 (-7.82)***
PRIO 0.34 0.47 0.43 0.50 0.094 ( 2.56)**
PREF 0.66 0.48 0.60 0.49 -0.054 (-1.48)
CERT 0.37 0.48 0.37 0.48 -0.000 (-0.01)
Observations 347 350
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Panel B: Comparisons of 33% Tobin’s Q samples
Low 33% Tobin’s
Q sample





and middle Q sample
Difference between
middle and high sample
Difference between
low and high sample
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Diff. t-value Diff. t-value Diff. t-value
I 0.161 0.325 0.174 0.219 0.325 0.384 0.013 ( 0.51) 0.150 ( 5.18)*** 0.164 ( 4.94)***
Q 0.923 0.136 1.213 0.197 2.083 0.988 0.290 (18.43)*** 0.870 (13.13)*** 1.160 (17.69)***
CF 0.190 0.186 0.391 0.431 0.656 0.836 0.201 ( 6.55)*** 0.265 ( 4.29)*** 0.466 ( 8.27)***
∆NWC 0.007 0.482 0.103 0.454 0.166 0.885 0.096 ( 2.22)** 0.063 ( 0.96) 0.159 ( 2.39)**
SLS 4.494 7.350 9.920 19.136 8.518 9.005 5.426 ( 4.05)*** -1.402 (-1.02) 4.024 ( 5.26)***
RVFA 1065.83 2522.31 3696.89 15578.14 1659.80 4432.78 2631.05 ( 2.56)** -2037.09 (-1.93)* 593.97 ( 1.77)*
DIV 0.274 0.216 0.361 1.304 0.365 0.402 0.087 ( 3.19)*** 0.004 ( 0.12) 0.092 ( 3.05)***
DEBT 0.160 0.115 0.109 0.101 0.113 0.099 -0.051 (-5.10)*** 0.004 ( 0.41) -0.047 (-4.73)***
BNK_IR 0.119 0.175 0.117 0.158 0.107 0.158 -0.001 (-0.08) -0.012 (-0.73) -1.193 (-0.77)
BNK_EQ 9.293 11.258 8.538 10.465 5.287 8.924 -0.755 (-0.75) -3.251 (-3.61)*** -4.006 (-4.24)***
C1 26.112 17.924 19.946 18.703 31.702 24.794 -6.166 (-3.63)*** 11.759 ( 5.79)*** 5.590 ( 2.78)***
INSIDE_EQ 5.273 17.219 4.204 15.395 8.598 21.512 -1.069 (-0.71) 4.394 ( 2.53)** 3.325 ( 1.83)*
SR 0.853 0.355 0.698 0.460 0.554 0.498 -0.155 (-4.07)*** -0.144 (-3.32)*** -0.299 (-7.42)***
BOARD 7.71 3.02 8.00 3.96 8.54 4.03 0.29 ( 0.89) 0.54 ( 1.45) 0.83 ( 2.50)**
S_BOARD 0.694 0.085 0.664 0.109 0.615 0.128 -0.031 (-3.38)*** -0.049 (-4.40) -0.079 (-7.83)***
PRIO 0.33 0.47 0.41 0.49 0.42 0.49 0.079 ( 1.78)* 0.01 ( 0.62) 0.08 ( 1.83)*
PREF 0.65 0.48 0.68 0.47 0.55 0.50 0.027 ( 0.62) -0.13 (-2.83)*** -0.10 (-2.20)**
CERT 0.36 0.48 0.44 0.50 0.32 0.47 0.079 ( 1.74)* -0.13 (-2.83)*** -0.05 (-1.08)
Observations 231 235 231
